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Abstract Policy makers in developing countries have increasingly pinned their
hopes on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in order to improve their chances in the
worldwide competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the effective-
ness of BITs in inducing higher FDI inflows is still open to debate. It is in several ways
that we attempt to clarify the inconclusive empirical findings of earlier studies. We
cover a much larger sample of host and source countries by drawing on an extensive
data set on bilateral FDI flows. Furthermore, we account for unilateral FDI liberal-
ization, in order not to overestimate the effect of BITs, as well as for the potential
endogeneity of BITs. Employing a gravity-type model and various model specifica-
tions, including an instrumental variable approach, we find that BITs do promote FDI
flows to developing countries. BITs may even substitute for weak domestic institu-
tions, though probably not for unilateral capital account liberalization.
Keywords FDI  Multinational corporations  Bilateral investment treaties
JEL Classification C33  F21  F23
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are widely perceived to be superior to other
types of capital inflows. Apart from offering additional investment resources, FDI
may help host countries foster economic development by offering access to
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internationally available technologies and managerial know-how, rendering it easier
for the host countries to penetrate foreign markets, and making them less prone to
sudden reversal of flows in times of crisis. At the UN Conference on Financing for
Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, Heads of State and
Government propagated the view that FDI provides an important means to
eradicate poverty in developing countries. According to the Monterrey Consensus,
the central challenge is to overcome the concentration of FDI in few (large and
relatively advanced) developing countries so that poor countries would be able to
reap the benefits of FDI (UN 2002).
Hence, it is not surprising that policy makers in almost all countries are engaged in
fierce competition for FDI inflows. However, it has remained disputed as to how
effective the means are that national policy makers have at their disposal when
attempting to attract FDI. Major driving forces of FDI (e.g., the size and development
of host country markets, the endowment of local factors of production, and
geographical and cultural proximity to major source countries) are largely beyond
the realm of short-term policy making. This may explain why policy makers have
increasingly pinned their hopes on two sets of measures: (i) unilateral regulatory
changes and incentives such as opening up previously restricted industries, removing
foreign ownership restrictions, promotional efforts, and tax and fiscal inducements;
and (ii) bilateral agreements through which host country governments commit
themselves to binding obligations, e.g., concerning the entry of foreign investors,
post-entry regulations, profit remittances and dispute settlement.
In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
in stimulating additional FDI inflows. The few empirical studies addressing this
question have produced highly ambiguous results (Sect. 2). We suspect that this is at
least partly due to the fairly small sample of host countries covered by most
previous studies. We make use of the extensive data on bilateral FDI flows collected
by UNCTAD (which is largely unpublished, but available from its Data Extract
Service). In this way, we avoid a sample selection bias which is likely to arise when
the sample is restricted to relatively advanced host countries. Moreover, this paper is
the first to address the issue of isolating the effects of BITs from the effects of
unilateral regulatory changes on FDI inflows.
After reviewing the results obtained by previous studies in Sect. 2, we illustrate
some stylized facts on both BITs and unilateral measures to liberalize the capital
account in Sect. 3. The gravity-type model applied is presented in Sect. 4, where we
also discuss methodological choices (notably the use of bilateral FDI flows) as well
as the data employed. Sect. 5 reports our main results. We find that BITs are
effective in promoting FDI inflows and may even substitute for weak domestic
institutions, though probably not for unilateral regulatory measures to promote FDI.
Various robustness checks are carried out in Sect. 6. Sect. 7 concludes.
2 Previous literature
More than 20 years ago, Schneider and Frey (1985) found it surprising that two
strands of the literature on the determinants of FDI had developed quite separately
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from each other. Studies stressing political factors had largely neglected economic
factors, whereas studies stressing economic factors had largely neglected political
factors. A similar dichotomy can still be observed even though the call by Schneider
and Frey for a politico-economic model that accounts for both economic and
political determinants is fairly common by now.
What recent studies tend to ignore is that policy makers in various countries have
resorted to two sets of measures to attract more FDI inflows: (i) unilateral, i.e., non-
binding changes in FDI-related regulations, most of which amount to a more
favorable treatment of FDI, and (ii) bilateral (as well as plurilateral) treaties in
which host countries have committed themselves in a legally binding way to grant
foreign investors various rights that reduce uncertainty with respect to entry and exit
conditions, post entry operations as well as dispute settlement mechanisms.
Several empirical analyses focus on unilateral measures. Examples include
Gastanaga et al. (1998), Asiedu and Lien (2004), Pica and Rodrı´guez Mora (2005),
Asiedu (2006), and Desai et al. (2006). Gastanaga et al. examine the effects of
various policy measures on FDI flows, including the role of investment regulations.
They employ two indicators of the degree of openness to international capital flows,
both of which are constructed from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions. Less restrictive capital
controls are typically associated with higher FDI inflows (pooled data for 49
developing countries in the period 1970–1995). Asiedu and Lien (2004) refer to the
same source, but consider three types of controls (multiple exchange rates, controls
on capital account transactions, and controls with regard to export proceeds) for a
broader panel of 96 developing countries in 1970–2000. The coefficients of all three
dummy variables are statistically significant; the absence of controls on capital
account transactions increases the ratio of FDI to GDP by about 0.6%. In a paper on
FDI in Africa, Asiedu (2006) refers to the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
to assess the host countries’ attitude towards inward FDI. The ICRG index
comprises four components: risk of operations, taxation, repatriation of profits, and
labor costs. Lagged openness to FDI according to this index is shown to have
positive effects on FDI in Africa. However, the coverage of this index extends well
beyond capital account restrictions. The same applies to the measures of ‘‘regulatory
distance’’ employed by Pica and Rodrı´guez Mora (2005),1 which they find to be
negatively related to bilateral FDI flows. By contrast, Desai et al. (2006) focus on a
more specific measure than the IMF’s overall assessment of capital controls, i.e.,
restrictions on capital repatriation and profit remittances as provided by Shatz
(2000). When using this more specific measure, the negative effects of capital
controls on FDI by US-based companies become stronger.
The few studies addressing the question whether the recent surge of BITs has
helped host countries attracting more FDI typically do not take into account that
unilateral liberalization of FDI regulations has proceeded at the same time.2 When
1 These authors use OECD data on product market regulations in OECD countries as well as the World
Bank’s Doing Business database.
2 This is even though it is sometimes discussed whether BITs may substitute for weak local (political and
economic) conditions; see below.
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discussed at all, unilateral measures are discounted as non-binding (Neumayer and
Spess 2005). This reasoning is based on the presumption that bilateral contractual
arrangements, in contrast to unilateral measures, provide a credible commitment
through which time-inconsistency problems can be overcome (Vandevelde 1998;
Hallward-Driemeier 2003; Elkins et al. 2006). Non-binding unilateral measures
would be time inconsistent if the host country had an incentive to renege on earlier
promises after the investment has been made.
Yet it is open to question whether the commitment through BITs is more
effective than unilateral liberalization. Theoretically, BITs would be superior if
attracting FDI were a one-time game. The host country could then easily renege on
unilateral promises with regard to the treatment of FDI once the foreign investor
realized the sunk costs associated with locating in the host country. In reality,
however, attracting FDI amounts to a repeated game in which the host country
strives for a continuous stream of FDI inflows from investors observing its behavior
in the past. In other words, reversing unilateral liberalization once some FDI is
‘‘locked in’’ would come at the cost of deterring future inflows.
Moreover, Vandevelde (1998) argues that the bilateral commitment is often of
limited value as BITs constitute ‘‘only a small part of a liberal investment regime’’
(p. 515) and ‘‘allow the host state considerable discretion’’ (p. 517). Most BITs
share important features: ‘‘The majority of existing BITs have very similar
provisions based as they are on the model treaties developed by the home countries
of the major MNCs’’ (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006, p. 8). In particular, BITs
typically include a guarantee of national treatment as well as most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment for FDI projects. In the ‘‘traditional admission model’’ (UNCTAD
2007), however, these guarantees apply only after FDI has been approved (post
establishment). Consequently, unilateral FDI liberalization going beyond the
traditional BIT model may offer more in terms of substance, even if BITs are
superior in terms of commitment.3
Apart from being used deliberately as a commitment device, Elkins et al. (2006)
present a ‘‘competitive model’’ to explain why it is rational for a host country to
expect higher FDI inflows through signing BITs. Host countries face a collective
action problem once it is taken into account that the conclusion of BITs involves
costs for them, e.g., by relegating adjudicative authority to foreign tribunals
(sovereignty costs). Host countries may be better off when collectively resisting the
demand of foreign investors for BITs. For the individual host country, however, it is
rational to sign BITs in order to gain reputational advantage and thereby, divert FDI
away from competing host countries.4 Especially countries competing for similar
types of FDI are expected to sign BITs, in order not to place themselves at a
disadvantage (see also Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005). However, this line of
reasoning not only applies to BITs but also to unilateral FDI liberalization.
3 Note, however, that ‘‘another—relatively small—category of BITs imposes a higher degree of
discipline on the contracting parties’’ (UNCTAD 2007, p. 155). We return to this issue in Sect. 4 and
discuss the resulting limitations of the dummy variable on BITs used here and in previous literature.
4 As discussed in more detail in Sect. 4, this argument leads us to consider the share of host country j in
total FDI flows from source country i to be our preferred FDI measure when specifying the empirical
model.
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While previous empirical studies on the effects of BITs have largely in common
that they do not account for unilateral FDI liberalization, their research design as
well as the data used and the sample of host and source countries differ
significantly.5 Hence, it is not surprising that empirical findings have remained
highly ambiguous. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) is the only study that employs
bilateral FDI flows for more than one source country, as we do in this paper.6 She
finds little evidence that BITs have stimulated FDI flows from OECD countries to
developing host countries. However, the study covers just 31 host countries. While
Hallward-Driemeier does not provide details on the sample, this is likely to bias
results as minor hosts of FDI typically go unreported in published OECD statistics
on FDI outflows.
Neumayer and Spess (2005) suspect that the dyadic approach of Hallward-
Driemeier underestimates the effects of BITs on FDI, and argue in favor of a non-
dyadic approach instead, since published data on aggregate FDI flows from all
sources are available for a much larger sample of host countries. Moreover, the non-
dyadic approach may capture spillover effects that BITs with important source
countries may have on FDI flows from other source countries. Indeed, Neumayer
and Spess find that developing host countries which have agreed to a larger number
of BITs have attracted higher FDI inflows. By contrast, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman
(2005, p. 23) conclude that ‘‘BITs do not seem to encourage FDI except at low
levels of political risk’’, even though their analysis, too, is non-dyadic. In particular,
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman reject the view that BITs are a substitute for a favorable
local business environment, whereas Neumayer and Spess report some evidence to
this effect.7 In another paper, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006) focus on political
and economic factors as complements to BITs. It turns out that the positive impact
of BITs on FDI inflows strongly depends on a supportive political-economic
environment.
The striking differences between previous studies may be partly due to sample
size. For instance, Neumayer and Spess (2005) cover a broader sample than Tobin
and Rose-Ackerman (2005). Results may also depend on whether (and in which
way) the possible endogeneity of BITs is taken into account.8 Salacuse and Sullivan
(2005) add another dimension to the debate. These authors find that BITs concluded
5 The short review of previous empirical literature is restricted to studies that focus on the effects of BITs
on FDI flows to developing countries, where this issue appears to be most relevant. Some other studies
concentrate on FDI relations within the OECD, or between OECD countries and a small number of East
and Central European transition countries; see Egger and Merlo (2007) for a recent example. Arguably,
these studies offer limited insights for policy makers in developing countries. They exclude ‘‘the very set
of poor to lower middle-income and small to medium-sized developing countries, for which the
conclusion of a DTT (or BIT, for that matter) can be an important instrument to woo foreign investors’’
(Neumayer 2007, p. 1506). See also Sect. 4 below.
6 Blonigen and Davies (2005) use bilateral FDI data to evaluate the effects of double taxation treaties.
7 Similar to Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005), Hallward-Driemeier (2003, p. 22) concludes: ‘‘A BIT has
not acted as a substitute for broader domestic reform.’’ Note, however, that none of the three studies
employs FDI-specific regulations as a control variable which with the BITs variable is interacted, as we
do in the following.
8 See Sect. 4 on how we deal with endogeneity.
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by developing countries with the United States lead to higher FDI inflows, whereas
BITs with other source countries do not.9
The gravity model results of Daude and Fratzscher (2008) provide further reason
to carefully test for the robustness of empirical estimates on the impact of BITs on
FDI inflows. Daude and Fratzscher focus on information frictions as determinants of
(bilateral) FDI stocks (and other types of foreign capital), but include BITs as a
control variable. The effect of BITs on FDI proves to be highly sensitive to the size
of the sample.10 The analysis of these authors is purely cross-sectional so that the
effects BITs may have over time remain open to question. Yet, this study provides
an important insight. In addition to their gravity model, Daude and Fratzscher assess
various factors that may explain the host country fixed effects emerging from this
model. Inter alia, they consider a dummy on capital account openness as well as
institutional indicators related to investor protection (risk of expropriation, risk of
repudiation and time of dispute settlement) as possible determinants of FDI. Even
though FDI is found to be relatively insensitive to these factors across host
countries, especially compared to portfolio investment, their analysis stands out in
that it takes account of the bilateral dimension of FDI determinants and host country
effects resulting from unilateral measures.
3 Stylized facts on BITs and unilateral FDI liberalization
The conclusion of BITs and unilateral FDI liberalization developed in unison with
each other. It is in both ways that host countries increasingly attempted to attract
FDI inflows, notably since the early 1990s. The number of BITs remained fairly
limited until the late 1970s. The conclusion of BITs gathered considerable
momentum during the last 15 years when the number of BITs soared from about
400 to almost 2,500 at the end of 2005 (Fig. 1).
Considering the contractual parties that have concluded BITs, Fig. 2 reveals that
developed countries are involved as a signatory in 60% of all BITs in force at the
end of 2005, with either developing countries (39%), transition countries (13%) or
another developed country (8%) representing the second signatory. Neumayer and
Spess (2005, p. 1573) argue that it is mainly BITs concluded between a developed
and a developing (or transition) country that can be expected to have significant
effects on FDI flows from the former to the latter. It should be noted, however, that
various developing countries account for a rising share of worldwide FDI outflows.
Taken together, developing source countries accounted for 12% of total outward
FDI stocks in 2005 (UNCTAD 2006).11 At the same time, an increasing number of
9 By contrast, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) do not find that US FDI is directed to host countries that
concluded BITs with the United States. Gallagher and Birch (2006) focus on Latin America. They show
that the total number of BITs had a positive effect on aggregate FDI flows to South America, whereas
having a BIT with the United States did not attract US FDI.
10 The number of observations varies considerably depending on the specification of the model, i.e., the
use of alternative indicators on information frictions.
11 Major developing source countries include Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan.
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BITs have been concluded among developing countries. Hence, it makes sense to
account for developing countries as source countries, too, as well as for BITs
concluded among developing countries. We will test for the robustness of our results
by running separate estimates for developed and developing source countries.
Similar to the time pattern observed for BITs, unilateral capital account
liberalization gathered momentum only in the 1990s. Fig. 3 portrays the Chinn–Ito
index on financial openness (Chinn and Ito 2005).12 The index is based on several
dummy variables, including the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on
26%
39%
10%
8%
13%
4%
between developing countries
between developed and developing countries
between developing countries and those of South-East Europe and CIS
between developed countries
between developed countries and those of South-East Europe and CIS
between countries of South-East Europe and CIS
Fig. 2 Total BITs concluded, by country group, as of end 2005. Source UNCTAD (2008b)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
end 1969 end 1979 end 1989 end 1999 end 2005
2000-2005
1990s
1980s
1970s
1960s
72 165
385
1857
2495
Fig. 1 Number of BITs concluded, 1969–2005. Source UNCTAD (2008b)
12 We would like to thank Hiro Ito for providing access to these data. See Sect. 4 for a short discussion of
alternative indicators of unilateral capital account liberalization.
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capital account transactions and requirements to surrender export proceeds.
Unilateral liberalization in these respects can reasonably be expected to help
attract higher FDI inflows. The index is calculated so that higher index values
indicate greater openness to cross-border capital transactions (with a mean of zero).
Prior to 1990, unilateral capital account liberalization according to the Chinn–Ito
index was largely confined to high-income OECD countries. By contrast, the 1990s
witnessed a major change in capital account regulations by non-OECD countries,
i.e., the host countries of FDI on which we focus in the following. Capital account
liberalization in this broadly defined group of countries continued in most recent
years. However, recent liberalization was restricted to the sub-group of middle-
income countries. Unilateral liberalization was discontinued by the sub-group of
low-income countries which, on average, still have much stricter capital account
restrictions.
Taken together, the short account of trends with respect to the conclusion of BITs
and unilateral regulatory changes that may help attract FDI inflows strongly
suggests accounting for both sets of policy measures when assessing the
effectiveness of BITs.
4 Method and data
As detailed below, we estimate a gravity-type model on the determinants of FDI. A
theoretically more appealing option might have been to base our estimations on the
well-known knowledge–capital model of the multinational enterprise (MNE)
developed by Carr et al. (2001). This model integrates the two major types of MNEs
into a single theoretical framework: horizontal MNEs with similar production
All countries All except high-income
OECD
Middle-income
countries
Low-income countries
1970  80   90  2000  04
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
-1.0
1970  80   90  2000  04 1970  80   90  2000  04 1970  80   90  2000  04
Fig. 3 Capital account liberalization, average for selected country groups 1970–2004. Note Country
classification according to World Bank (2006); see text for explanation of the Chinn–Ito index on
financial openness. Source Chinn and Ito (2005)
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activities in their home and host countries and vertical MNEs with segmented value
chains and headquarter services in the (more advanced) home country. Essential
elements of the knowledge–capital model determining the type of MNE activity
include trade and investment costs, the size of markets, skill endowments, as well as
interactions, e.g., between size and endowment differences of the host and home
countries of MNEs.
A major advantage of the knowledge–capital model is that it yields testable
hypotheses on the relevance of the driving forces of horizontal and vertical FDI.
Yet, deriving the estimation equation from this model meets with several problems
in the present context of employing the largest possible panel data set on bilateral
FDI to contain sample selection bias. Data restrictions prevent us from capturing
several of the above noted essential elements of the knowledge–capital model.
Especially for low-income countries, data on skill endowments are often not
available for sufficiently long periods of time. Comparable indicators on trade and
investment costs, ranging back in time, are available for just a small part of our host
country sample. Apart from data constraints, Egger and Merlo (2007) have argued
that empirical models based on Carr et al. (2001) perform less well in panel settings
such as the current one. Specifically, the interaction terms of the knowledge–capital
model lead to multicollinearity among the regressors, which Egger and Merlo
consider to be particularly harmful in the time dimension of FDI panel data. Note
also that we define the dependent FDI variable as the share of host country j in
source country i’s overall FDI. While this preferred definition follows from the
aforementioned ‘‘competitive model’’ of BITs by Elkins et al. (2006), it would fit
less well with the knowledge–capital model.
Therefore, we follow large parts of the relevant literature and estimate a gravity-
type model on the determinants of FDI.13 As noted by Deardorff (1998), this class of
models first appeared in the empirical literature on bilateral trade flows without
much serious attempt to justify them theoretically. However, Deardorff shows that
even simple gravity models can be derived from standard trade theories. More
recently, gravity models have also been applied to analyze bilateral FDI; prominent
examples include: Shatz (2003), Mutti and Grubert (2004), Martin and Rey (2004),
as well as Portes and Rey (2005). Shatz’ (2003) analysis of US FDI clearly reveals
that sample selection matters for empirical results.14 However, none of these studies
considers BITs to be a possible determinant of FDI.
According to Portes and Rey (2005, p. 275), the gravity approach ‘‘emerges
naturally’’ from theories of asset trade. In order to avoid misspecification and
omitted variable biases, however, unobservable host and source country effects, as
well as bilateral effects have to be controlled for.15 Anderson and van Wincoop
13 Blonigen et al. (2007, 1309) note that the gravity model ‘‘is arguably the most widely used empirical
specification of FDI’’.
14 As noted by Shatz (2003, p. 118), ‘‘national statistical agencies publish bilateral data about the
investment activities of their multinationals only for host countries that have sizeable inflows of FDI. This
means that nearly all research on foreign direct investment focuses on the winners, countries that have
achieved at least some success in attracting FDI. This is a significant problem since policy advice is most
often sought by the countries that are excluded from analysis’’.
15 We are particularly grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this point.
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(2003) stressed so-called ‘‘multilateral resistance’’ as an important potential source
of omitted variable bias in trade-related gravity equations. Accordingly, trade
between two partner countries depends on bilateral barriers relative to the average
barriers of the two countries to trade with all their trading partners. Baier and
Bergstrand (2007, p. 75) note that some earlier contributions have in common with
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) multilateral (price) resistance terms that ‘‘price
levels or some form of multilateral price indexes surface theoretically.’’
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) as well as Feenstra (2004) argue that country-
specific fixed effects offer a computationally simple method to account for
multilateral resistance terms and, thereby, generate consistent coefficient estimates
in cross-section gravity models.16 In a panel setting of bilateral trade, Baier and
Bergstrand (2007) demonstrate that most plausible estimates of the average effect of
free-trade agreements on trade flows are obtained with pair fixed effects and
country-and-time effects.17 Note that multilateral resistance terms would be time
varying in a panel setting, suggesting to include country-specific dummies for each
time period. Bergstrand and Egger (2007) provide a similar theoretical rationale for
estimating gravity equations of bilateral FDI flows (and foreign affiliate sales). In
particular, they include bilateral pair fixed effects to eliminate any omitted variable
bias associated with unobserved time-invariant pair-specific heterogeneity.18
Against this backdrop, we include host-year and source-year effects as well as
pair fixed effects to achieve a consistent estimate of the impact of BITs on bilateral
FDI. The basic specification of our gravity model reads as follows:
ln
FDIijt
FDIit
 
¼ a0 þ c0Xjt þ u0Yijt þ a1BITijt þ kt þ lit þ /jt þ eijt ð1Þ
where FDIijt stands for foreign direct investment of country i in country j in period t,
FDIit for total FDI of country i in all (developing) countries included in our sample,
Xjt represents a set of host country control variables, Yijt denotes the difference
between source and host country characteristics, kt is a set of year dummies, and
BITijt corresponds to a ratified bilateral investment treaty. We also control for
source-year effects (lit) and host-year effects (/jt).
In order to be able to compare our results with those of previous studies such as
Hallward-Driemeier (2003), Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman (2005, 2006), we follow them in using FDI flows as our dependent
variable. This is not to ignore that FDI flows are a flawed proxy for the activity of
MNEs. However, clearly superior measures such as MNE sales, production or
employment are available for just a few of the host-source country pairs. In terms of
data availability, FDI stocks offer the only alternative. But stocks are not necessarily
16 The fixed-effect approach might result in less efficient coefficient estimates, compared to using the
explicit multilateral resistance terms. Yet, Feenstra (2004, p. 161–162) considers the fixed-effect
approach to be the preferred empirical method due to its computational simplicity.
17 See also Egger (2000, p. 29) who argued in a panel setting of trade flows that ‘‘the proper econometric
specification of the gravity equation in most applications would be one of fixed country and time effects’’.
18 In contrast to Baier and Bergstrand (2007), multilateral resistance terms are assumed to be ‘‘slow
moving’’ by Bergstrand and Egger (2007, p. 284) so that pair fixed effects are supposed to capture also
‘‘the (most important) cross-sectional influence of these terms’’.
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superior to flows as a measure of MNE activity. Lipsey (2001, p. 17) concluded
from reviewing the literature that FDI stocks ‘‘tell us little about what kind of
activity is taking place, and what they tell us is often wrong.’’ More recently,
Mayer-Foulkes and Nunnenkamp (2009), applying various measures of US FDI,
also find that FDI stocks are probably even less suited than flows to reflect MNE
activity.
More specifically, we follow Hallward-Driemeier (2003) in that we use bilateral
FDI flows. We overcome the critique of Neumayer and Spess (2005) concerning the
limited host country coverage of previous dyadic analyses by fully exploiting the
(largely unpublished) data on bilateral FDI flows available upon request from
UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service. As discussed in Sect. 2, the dyadic approach may
underestimate the impact of BITs if the host country, by concluding a BIT with one
source country, signals to other source countries that their FDI will be protected in
the same way. However, signaling effects cannot necessarily be attributed to BITs
once it is taken into account that host countries have followed a two-pronged
approach of unilateral FDI liberalization and bilateral commitments through BITs
(Sect. 3). Any BIT-related signaling to third parties is no more credible than non-
binding unilateral liberalization. Hence, we control for unilateral liberalization in
our dyadic approach in order not to overestimate the effects of BITs on FDI inflows.
Our preferred definition of the dependent variable is the share of FDI attracted by
a specific host country in total FDI flows from the source country under
consideration to all developing host countries included in our sample. This measure
captures the attractiveness of a particular developing country relatively to other
developing countries. Moreover, this FDI measure clearly relates to the theoretical
model of Elkins et al. (2006), according to which host countries sign BITs in order
to divert FDI away from competing host countries. As part of our extensive
robustness tests in Sect. 6, we employ two additional specifications of the dependent
variable: FDI inflows in US$ million and FDI as a share of GDP.
Since there is a large number of zero observations for FDI at a bilateral level, we
consider two variants of our preferred FDI measure, with (FDI1) or without zero
observations (FDI2). It is highly likely that the missing data in our data set are in
fact zeros, since we consider FDI at a bilateral level for a long period of time.
Hence, FDI1 includes missing values as zero observations even though there might
be some unreported FDI figures due to confidentiality. We calculate 3-year averages
in order to smooth the considerable fluctuation of annual bilateral FDI flows. At the
same time, this approach ensures that we have enough variation in the data.
Negative FDI flows (for 3-year averages) were set equal to zero to include as many
observations as possible.19
We employ a fairly standard set of controls. We include total real host country
GDP and real GDP growth for market seeking FDI (labeled GDP and Growth,
respectively), host country inflation (Inflation), host country openness to trade
(Openness), and the difference in GDP per capita between the source and the host
country for vertical FDI (DiffGDPpc). Moreover, we incorporate dummies for the
existence of a bilateral or regional trading agreement, that is, a free trade agreement
19 The results hardly change if we exclude negative values.
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or customs union (RTA), a double taxation treaty (DTT), and a common currency
(CommonCurrency).20 We expect a positive association of GDP, Growth,
DiffGDPpc, RTA, DTT, and CommonCurrency with FDI; the opposite applies to
Inflation, as this variable can be interpreted as a proxy for macroeconomic
distortions.21
To reduce the skewness in the data, we take the natural logarithm of GDP, FDI1,
FDI2, DiffGDPpc, and Inflation. To avoid the loss of observations for which we
have negative values or zeros, for example for Inflation, we use the following
logarithmic transformation:
y ¼ ln x þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2 þ 1ð Þ
p 
ð2Þ
whereas the sign of x is unchanged, the values of x pass from a linear scale at small
absolute values to a logarithmic scale at large values by using this transformation.
Institutional development of host countries, proxied by political constraints on
the executive branch (PolCon), is included as a control variable as poor institutions
may discourage FDI by giving rise to uncertainty (e.g., with respect to the protection
of property rights; Lee and Mansfield 1996; Henisz 2000) and additional costs (e.g.,
in the case of corruption; Wei 2000). We use the index for political constraints that
has been developed by Henisz (2000). In contrast to alternative institutional
indicators, this variable is available for a large number of countries and years.
PolCon focuses on the political discretion of the executive branch. Less discretion is
supposed to render credible commitments to (foreign) investors more likely. The
indicator ranges from zero (total political discretion) to one (no political discretion).
Thus, we expect a positive link between PolCon and FDI flows.
In contrast to earlier studies, we mitigate the omitted variable bias by controlling
for unilateral regulatory changes that may have an impact on FDI flows. Note that
unilateral regulatory changes typically apply to FDI from all sources in the same
way. We use the Chinn–Ito index measuring a country’s capital account openness
(CapOpen), expecting a positive link between CapOpen and FDI flows. The Chinn–
Ito index is available for the period 1970–2004 and for more than 160 countries.
Given its broad coverage over time and across countries, the Chinn–Ito index is
clearly superior to other possible measures of FDI-related local restrictions.22 For
example, UNCTAD’s account of changes in national FDI regulations is not
available for specific host countries. The World Economic Forum (2006) presents
survey information on foreign ownership restrictions for 125 countries, but this
information is not available over time. The time series data of Quinn and Toyoda
(2008) on countries’ policies towards the capital account come closest to the Chinn–
Ito index.23 However, country coverage (94) is far from that of the Chinn–Ito index.
20 See Table 6 in Appendix 1 for exact definitions and data sources for all variables.
21 Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 7 in Appendix 1.
22 See Quinn and Toyoda (2008) for a comparison of different measures on capital account openness.
23 We would like to thank Dennis Quinn for providing access to these data, derived from the coding of de
jure measures published in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions. The
scoring takes into account the severity of restrictions in various categories of financial transactions.
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In particular, low-income countries are underrepresented in the Quinn–Toyoda data
set, giving rise to a sample selection bias.24
As concerns our variable of principal interest, BIT stands for a ratified bilateral
investment treaty between the source and the host country. While we could have
used the date of signing a BIT, we rather employ the date of ratification since only
ratified BITs offer protection to (foreign) investors.25 Accordingly, the BIT variable
represents a dummy taking the value of 1 when FDI flows from a specific source
country to a specific host country were governed by a (ratified) BIT in a particular
year. Since we use 3-year averages for all variables, BIT takes the value of either 0,
0.33, 0.66, or 1.
While we follow previous studies in employing a dummy variable for BITs, the
resulting limitations should be kept in mind. Treating BITs as homogenous may be
justified to the extent that most of them share important characteristics; but this
‘‘does not mean…that all agreements provide the same degree of investment
protection’’ (UNCTAD 2007, p. 155). In particular, some recent BITs have
broadened the coverage of FDI-related issues and have become more binding. We
tentatively address this issue in Sect. 6 by testing whether recent BITs have been
more effective than older BITs in promoting FDI inflows. We also perform separate
estimations for BITs concluded with the United States, which has been the
frontrunner in pressing for stricter BITs and imposing more discipline on host
countries (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006, p. 8). However, it is clearly beyond the
scope of the present paper to classify the about 2,500 BITs according to the degree
of protection offered.26
To check the robustness of our results, we use different estimation techniques:
For a start, we ignore the potential endogeneity of BIT. First of all, we estimate a
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed-effects model. This is in line with the
recent literature on a theoretically motivated gravity equation. Indeed, a standard
Hausman test indicated that this model is preferred in comparison to a random-
effects model. We then estimate a fixed-effects Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) model to account for the fact that the sample includes a large
number of zero observations (FDI1).
In the next step, we account for possible endogeneity. While ratifying a BIT
could increase FDI flows to a developing country, we cannot rule out reverse
causality. Above all, investors might press their government to ratify BITs with host
countries in which they are heavily engaged, though feeling insecure regarding, for
example, expropriation or the repatriation of profits. Neumayer and Spess (2005) lag
BITs by one period to mitigate potential reverse causality, but dismiss instrumental
24 The sample of Quinn and Toyoda includes just 18 countries with a per capita income of less than US$
875 (2005), compared to 47 low-income countries for which the Chinn–Ito index is available. Moreover,
the Quinn–Toyoda data set covers just four annual observations for the period under consideration here,
with 1997 being the most recent observation for most of the country sample. Hence, it is also with respect
to the time dimension that the Chinn–Ito index is to be preferred for the present purpose.
25 A few countries signed BITs but never ratified them; for example, Brazil was signatory of 14 non-
ratified BITs as of 1 June 2008. Any impact of the signed BITs is thus questionable.
26 As argued by Neumayer (2007) with respect to DTTs, this would require an enormous effort; various
provisions may be next to impossible to quantify.
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variable (IV) regressions for lack of appropriate instruments.27 One period lags can
be problematic, however, especially when using annual data as in Neumayer and
Spess (2005).
As for the instrumentation technique, we use a dynamic Generalized Methods of
Moments (GMM) estimator, as some of the control variables may be endogenous,
too. For instance, FDI may affect the overall trading volume (and, thus, Openness) if
foreign companies import intermediate goods and export processed goods, or may
have an impact on growth in the host country. More specifically, we employ the
system GMM estimator, introduced by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and
Bond (1998), which is derived from the estimation of a system of two simultaneous
equations: the first one in levels (with lagged first differences as instruments), and
the second one in first differences (with lagged levels as instruments). As shown by
Blundell and Bond (1998), the system GMM performs better than the difference
GMM, as the latter can have poor finite sample properties and is downwards biased,
especially when the number of periods t is small. Moreover, the difference GMM is
not suitable for the BIT variable which changes its value only in periods of the
ratification of a bilateral investment treaty.
Our analysis covers the period 1978–2004, that is, nine observations of 3-year
averages for all indicators. UNCTAD’s Data Extract Service provides FDI data
since 1970, but very few countries report FDI flows for the 1970s at a bilateral level.
To avoid any biases arising from an extremely small sample of reporting countries,
we start with 1978. We include the maximum number of source and host countries
for which bilateral FDI flows are available, except financial offshore centers, such as
Panama, The Bahamas, or the Cayman Islands.28 However, as concerns the hosts of
FDI, we follow most of the previous studies and consider developing countries only.
It is mainly for them that BITs may compensate for less developed local institutions
and can, thus, be expected to promote FDI inflows. At the same time, extending the
sample to include a large number of poor developing host countries is crucial to
avoid a sample selection bias and to assess the chances of these countries to become
more attractive to FDI. Our sample consists of 83 developing host countries, which
is almost three times as large as the sample used by Hallward-Driemeier (2003). By
covering 28 source countries of FDI, including various non-OECD source countries,
we at least partly capture the recent surge of FDI flows from developing countries to
other developing countries.29
27 Hallward-Driemeier (2003) applies the number of BITs a host country has concluded with third
countries as an instrument for the BITs concluded between particular pairs. This instrumentation is
awkward if Neumayer and Spess (2005) are right in that BITs concluded with a particular source country
have signaling effects and may, thus, be correlated with FDI from other sources, too. Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) use a time variable and the level of democracy in the host country as instruments. The
reason given for this instrumentation is that, observing that more and more countries conclude BITs, a
particular host country may feel the need to join this trend in order not to be left out. However, this
argument rather suggests employing the number of BITs concluded by other host countries, and in
particular by neighboring host countries, as an instrument for pair-wise BITs concluded by the particular
host country under consideration.
28 The FDI data for financial offshore centers are highly likely to be biased. We exclude all countries that
are on the list of offshore financial centers as reported by Eurostat (2005).
29 See Appendices 2 and 3 for the source and host country sample.
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5 Main results
Following the model specification and the introduction of the variables, we now turn
to the empirical results. We start with the OLS fixed-effects technique and focus, for
a start, on FDI1 [columns (1)–(4) in Table 1]. In Model I, we include all relevant
control variables except CapOpen.30 As expected, FDI is clearly flowing to larger
markets (marking seeking, or horizontal FDI), as the coefficient for the size of the
host country market is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. The same
applies to the difference in GDP per capita between source and host countries
(vertical FDI). While higher inflation is associated with lower FDI inflows, ratifying
a regional trade agreement or a double taxation treaty boosts FDI. Improved
institutional quality in the host country is also associated with an increase in FDI.
Economic growth, openness to trade of the host economy or a common currency
between source and host countries all have the expected positive sign but fail to
reach conventional significance levels.
Finally, the BIT variable has a positive coefficient and is significant at the 1%
level, meaning that having a BIT ratified with the source country is associated with
an increase in FDI flows to the host country. Concerning the economic impact, some
peculiarities have to be taken into account. According to Kennedy (1981), the
impact g* of a dummy variable on a dependent variable that enters the empirical
model as a logarithm would have to be approximated appropriately as follows31:
g ¼ exp c^1
2
V
^
c
^   1 ð3Þ
with c
^
the estimated coefficient for BIT in our case, and V
^
the estimated variance of c
^
.
A further complication results from the transformation of variables according to
Eq. 2 above, which helped us keeping zero and negative observations. This
transformation implies that the dependent FDI variable has a linear and a
logarithmic part, with the former ranging up to 1% in the case of FDI1. With
the mean of about 0.3 for FDI1 remaining considerably below this threshold, the
coefficient for BIT in column (1) of Table 1 suggests that, at the mean,
the conclusion of BITs with all source countries would raise the host country’s
share in total FDI flows from all source countries by almost 35%.
The overall fit of the fixed-effects estimations regarding the (within) R2 is
relatively low. It should be noted that FDI1 and FDI2 stand for relative shares in
FDI inflows into developing countries and that we cover a fairly diverse sample of
28 source and 83 developing (host) countries.32 Hence, a much better fit was hardly
to be expected. In fact, our model fit is quite similar to those obtained by Hallward-
Driemeier (2003) and Neumayer and Spess (2005).
In Model II, reported in column (2), we add CapOpen to control for unilateral
capital account liberalizations by host countries. The coefficient of CapOpen has the
30 The sample declines by 330 observations if CapOpen is included (Model II).
31 This point is stressed by Egger and Merlo (2007) in the context of BITs and FDI.
32 Overall, our sample consists of 14,077 observations and 2,313 country pairs, that is, more than four
times as many country pairs as used by Hallward-Driemeier (2003), who employed 537 pairs.
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expected positive sign and is significant at the 5% level. While the BIT variable
keeps the positive sign, the size of the estimated coefficient is slightly lower. This is
consistent with our expectation that the impact of BITs on FDI flows tends to be
overestimated when ignoring unilateral measures of capital account liberalization.
Next we consider the possibility that the impact of BITs may depend on major
characteristics of the host country by including interaction terms of institutional
development (PolCon) and capital account openness (CapOpen) with the BIT
variable (Models III and IV). This allows us to test whether BITs might act as a
complement or substitute for unilateral improvements in institutions and the degree
of capital account openness. In column (3), PolCon turns out to be still significantly
positive while the interaction term PolCon 9 BIT is negative (and highly significant
at the 1% level). This suggests that BITs may substitute for institutional quality in
the host country. The evidence is considerably weaker for the second interaction
term, CapOpen 9 BIT; the sign of the coefficient is also negative, but just fails to
pass the conventional 10% significance level. The BIT variable, on the other hand, is
always positive and significant at the 1% level.33
In the remaining four columns of Table 1, we report the results for the same
model specifications, except that we use FDI2 as the dependent variable. Note the
considerable decline in both the number of observations (by some 10,300) and the
number of country pairs (from 2,313 to 870). The substantial drop in the sample
affects the size and significance level of the coefficients for a number of control
variables. Most notably, Inflation, RTA, and DTT are no longer significant.34
Importantly, BIT always remains positive and significant at the 1% level. Thus, even
if we exclude the (large number of) zero observations for the dependent variable, the
positive linkage between ratified BITs and FDI inflows still holds. Moreover, the
size of the coefficients of BIT is considerably larger with FDI2 as the dependent
variable, compared to the estimations with FDI1. This suggests that BITs help less
in countries that appear to be totally unattractive (and, thus, have zero FDI inflows).
Still, it can be argued that the inclusion of a large number of zeros in FDI1 might
bias the results, since OLS might not be the appropriate estimation technique for this
sample. To account for this possibility, we employ the PPML estimator that has been
suggested for gravity trade models by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Unlike the OLS
method, the PPML estimator is consistent even in the presence of heteroskedasticity
and it will not ignore zero FDI flows.35 We use fixed effects and the same four model
specifications (Models I–IV) as before, but focus on FDI1 only. As can be seen in
Table 2, the results for most of the previously used control variables are similar to the
33 Note the increase in the size of the coefficient for BIT from Models I and II to Model III. This is
mainly due to the fact that we add the interaction term. To get the net impact of a ratification of a BIT, we
would have to take the estimated coefficient for the interaction term into account too. The overall impact
in this specification (and all other specifications in the following) is always positive and significant, which
has been confirmed by an appropriate F-test.
34 Note that DTT turns out to be positive and highly significant when excluding the BIT variable in the
regressions with FDI2. Obviously, a large number of countries ratified both BITs and DTTs more or less
at the same time, thereby making it difficult to sort out the net impact of both variables on FDI flows.
35 We also employed a Tobit model to examine the robustness of the results. Importantly, the BIT
variable remains positive and highly significant.
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OLS results in Table 1. However, Growth is now clearly significant, whereas
Inflation, RTA, and DTT remain insignificant in Table 2.36 Better institutions and a
liberalized capital account are still strongly associated with higher FDI inflows.
Importantly, independent of the model specification, BIT is always positive and
significant at the 5% level or better. Similar to the OLS fixed-effects estimation, the
first interaction term maintains its negative coefficient and is highly significant,
whereas the interaction term CapOpen 9 BIT is now significant too. This provides
further evidence that BITs might act as a substitute for institutional quality and
maybe even for capital account liberalization. Concerning institutional quality, our
finding corroborates the results reported by Neumayer and Spess (2005),37 rather
than the results obtained by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and Hallward-
Driemeier (2003) according to whom BITs are only effective in stimulating FDI in
countries with an already stable political and business environment. Again, we think
that the sample selection bias of most of the previous studies can explain these
contrasting results.
So far, we have assumed that the BIT variable is exogenous. As noted before,
however, FDI may affect the ratification of BITs if foreign companies press for
some sort of protection of their capital invested abroad. This is why we proceed with
the system GMM in Table 3 estimator to account for endogeneity of the BIT
Table 2 PPML fixed-effects estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ln (FDI1) ln (FDI1) ln (FDI1) ln (FDI1)
Model I II III IV
BIT 0.180*** (2.58) 0.136** (1.93) 0.463*** (3.85) 0.153** (2.15)
ln (GDP) 0.461*** (3.91) 0.556*** (4.46) 0.524*** (4.17) 0.562*** (4.51)
ln (DiffGDPpc) 0.0763*** (4.52) 0.0792*** (4.68) 0.0793*** (4.68) 0.0794*** (4.68)
Growth 0.0257*** (4.59) 0.0257*** (4.59) 0.0246*** (4.40) 0.0256*** (4.58)
ln (Inflation) -0.0113 (-0.75) -0.0120 (-0.75) -0.0156 (-0.98) -0.0129 (-0.81)
Openness -0.000692 (-0.50) 0.000629 (0.44) 0.00125 (0.86) 0.000677 (0.47)
RTA 0.0797 (0.97) 0.0668 (0.81) 0.0788 (0.95) 0.0793 (0.96)
PolCon 0.390** (2.52) 0.424*** (2.72) 0.690*** (3.94) 0.435*** (2.79)
DTT 0.0491 (0.63) 0.0192 (0.24) -0.000180 (-0.0023) 0.0141 (0.18)
CommonCurrency 0.173 (0.92) 0.104 (0.55) 0.117 (0.62) 0.111 (0.59)
CapOpen 0.0657*** (2.67) 0.0660*** (2.68) 0.0935*** (3.27)
PolCon 9 BIT -0.911*** (-3.36)
CapOpen 9 BIT -0.0726* (-1.91)
Observations 14,077 13,747 13,747 13,747
Country pairs 2,313 2,313 2,313 2,313
z-values are reported in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%,
respectively. See Table 1 for further notes
36 Again, DTT would be highly significant if we excluded the BIT variable.
37 Neumayer and Spess (2005) use several indicators for institutional quality and also find that the
interaction terms are not always significant.
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variable (and most of our control variables). All specifications pass the Sargan–
Hansen J statistic test for overidentifying restrictions, demonstrating that the
instrument set can be considered valid, and the F tests for the Arellano–Bond tests
for serial correlation support the model specification.
In all four models and for both FDI variables (FDI1 and FDI2), we find that the
coefficient of the BIT variable remains positive and significant, in most cases at the
5 or 1% level. The GMM approach thus corroborates that ratifying a BIT with a
source country leads to higher FDI inflows from that country.38 In line with our
expectations, the estimated coefficients of BIT are typically smaller in the system
GMM regressions in comparison to the fixed-effects estimations. The exceptions are
the two regressions for Model IV. This model specification includes the interaction
term (CapOpen 9 BIT), which is not significant but would have to be taken into
account when calculating the final impact of the BIT variable on FDI inflows.
Overall, we can conclude that the fixed-effects estimates tend to overstate the
impact of BITs on bilateral FDI inflows, whereas the GMM estimates do not suffer
from this bias and are, thus, more reliable.
6 Sensitivity tests
We check the robustness of our main findings by using several additional model
specifications. In view of space constraints, we focus on the GMM regressions and
only report the coefficients for the BIT variable with FDI1 as the dependent
variable.39 First, we exclude RTA. Recall that we controlled for regional trade
agreements since they increasingly include FDI-related prescriptions, thus reducing
investor uncertainty. Hence, the isolated impact of BITs should be biased upwards if
RTAs are ignored. This expectation turns out to be true. The coefficient of BIT,
reported in Table 4, is slightly larger when replicating the estimations without
RTA.40
Second, we exclude double taxation treaties as a considerable number of
countries sign both types of bilateral treaties. Hence, the impact of BITs on FDI
flows might be biased. As expected, the size of the coefficients for the BIT variable
roughly doubles if the DTT variable is omitted.
Third, we exclude all transition countries. It can be argued that our results might
be biased due to the inclusion of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since
the countries in this region have received much more FDI (or for the first time) after
1990 and, at the same time, have signed various BITs with developed countries.
Indeed, the exclusion of transition countries results in smaller (and sometimes even
38 For the interaction terms, we obtain the same outcome as in the fixed-effects estimation, that is, a
negative coefficient for PolCon 9 BIT and CapOpen 9 BIT, though only the former is statistically
significant.
39 All GMM robustness checks reported in this section have also been performed for the OLS and PPML
models as well as for FDI2. As the sign and significance levels of the coefficients are quite similar, we do
not report them. Like all other non-reported results, they can be obtained from the first author upon
request.
40 For reference, we show previous GMM estimates for the full sample in the first row of Table 4.
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negative) coefficients of BIT. The BIT variable remains significantly positive in
only one out of four model specifications. Note, however, that the results for Models
I–III are not reliable for the reduced sample without transition countries; the
Sargan–Hansen J statistic test for overidentifying restrictions indicates that the
instrument set is not valid, and we do have serial correlation here. Still, BITs tend to
be more effective in transition countries. The reason may be that many transition
countries lacked any reputation concerning the credibility of unilateral measures
immediately after the regime change.
Fourth, the size of the BIT coefficient also declines slightly when excluding
resource-intensive host countries. This is surprising since the availability of natural
resources in host countries could be expected to provide such a strong incentive to
foreign companies that they care less about protection of resource-seeking FDI.
While our results do not support this view, they are subject to some qualifications.
The data situation is far from perfect. The World Bank criterion we use for
classifying resource-intensive host countries41 is not available for various countries
Table 4 Robustness checks and extensions, system GMM estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ln (FDI1) ln (FDI1) ln (FDI1) ln (FDI1)
Model I II III IV
Full sample
(as reported in Table 3)
0.0598** (2.20) 0.0537** (1.94) 0.0575** (2.03) 0.286*** (4.20)
Excl. RTA 0.0796*** (3.01) 0.0715*** (2.66) 0.0750*** (2.70) 0.299*** (4.34)
Excl. DTT 0.122*** (4.92) 0.121*** (4.89) 0.125*** (4.93) 0.354*** (5.16)
Excl. transition countries -0.000619 (-0.022) -0.00540 (-0.19) -0.00575 (-0.19) 0.168** (2.40)
Excl. resource-intensive
countriesa
0.0437** (1.95) 0.0351* (1.71) 0.0354* (1.81) 0.216*** (2.90)
Low-income countries 0.113*** (2.99) 0.112*** (3.04) 0.107*** (3.28) 0.232*** (2.93)
Middle-income countries 0.0478** (1.99) 0.0334* (1.82) 0.0449* (1.78) 0.327*** (3.66)
Period 1990–2004 0.0486* (1.72) 0.0438* (1.68) 0.0491* (1.66) 0.248*** (3.61)
Developed source countries 0.0688** (2.38) 0.0621** (2.10) 0.0644** (2.13) 0.260*** (3.85)
Developing source
countries
0.0386 (0.60) 0.0393 (0.62) 0.0554 (0.84) 0.678*** (2.81)
United States as source
country
-0.0729 (-1.60) -0.0662 (-1.44) -0.0652 (-1.43) -0.0428 (-0.42)
Incl. total number of BITs
ratified by source country
0.0741** (2.50) 0.0689** (2.30) 0.0728** (2.38) 0.307*** (4.63)
To save space, we only report the results for the BIT variable with FDI1 as the dependent variable; z-values are
reported in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. See
Tables 1 and 3 for further notes
a Algeria, Bolivia, China, Rep. of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Guyana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New
Guinea, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Zambia
41 We classify a country as resource-intensive if its resource rents, that is, energy plus mineral depletion
in percent of GNI, are higher than 15% in the first three-year period (1978–1980). See the notes below
Table 4 for all resource-intensive countries that have been excluded in this set of regressions.
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of our sample. This may affect results especially because some countries in which
FDI is fairly likely to be resource-seeking could not be classified (e.g., Azerbaijan,
Equatorial Guinea, or Kazakhstan). Moreover, foreign companies are most likely to
be rather lenient about protection in the case of oil. However, many oil-exporting
countries are not included in our sample of host countries, as the required data for
the independent variables are not available.
Fifth, we run separate estimations for low- and middle-income host countries.
The BIT variable retains its positive impact for both sub-groups.42 One could have
expected relatively strong effects for middle-income host countries. More advanced
host countries should be better able to make use of FDI-specific assets, for example,
by infringing on property rights. Hence, there might be greater uncertainty for
foreign companies in host countries with higher imitative capacity. However, it is
only in Model IV that we find evidence for a stronger link between credible
protection through BITs and FDI inflows, compared to low-income countries with
less imitative capacity. The evidence is rather the opposite in columns (1)–(3) of
Table 4, possibly because low-income countries have less reputation concerning the
credibility of unilateral measures.
Sixth, the picture remains essentially the same when our estimations are based
on a shorter period of observation (1990–2004, instead of 1978–2004). It should
be noted, however, that the size of the BIT coefficients is slightly smaller
compared to the complete period. This outcome may come as a surprise, since one
could have expected that more recent BITs were more effective in promoting FDI
as the coverage of FDI-related issues became broader and more binding in the
course of time. Interestingly, our results are similar to what Blonigen and Davies
(2005) find with regard to bilateral tax treaties: While older tax treaties are
positively associated with FDI, this does not apply to more recent tax treaties.
There are several possible explanations why BITs have not become more effective
over time. Increasingly binding BITs may essentially mean that it becomes easier
for foreign companies to remit profits and repatriate capital, which ceteris paribus
would reduce net FDI inflows.43 Moreover, BITs may suffer from diminishing
returns due to their proliferation (UNCTAD 1998; Nunnenkamp and Pant 2003;
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2006). In contrast to earlier times, the conclusion of a
BIT is no longer a distinctive factor signaling a particular host country’s readiness
to offer favorable FDI conditions. Rather, foreign companies may increasingly
tend to regard BITs as a standard feature of the institutional framework governing
FDI worldwide.
Seventh, we perform separate estimations for developed and developing source
countries. It appears that BITs are effective only in stimulating FDI flows from
developed source countries to developing countries. By contrast, Models I–III
suggest that BITs do not matter as a commitment device in developing countries’
FDI relations with other developing countries. This finding may justify the
42 By contrast, Neumayer (2007) finds that double taxation treaties were effective in increasing FDI flows
only to middle-income host countries.
43 In the context of tax treaties, Blonigen and Davies (2005) refer to concerns that such treaties arise due
to lobbying efforts by profit-seeking investors. They conclude that treaties may then be geared towards
maximizing investor profits rather than promoting FDI.
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assumption of Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006, p. 15), who consider only BITs
concluded with high-income OECD partner countries ‘‘on the ground that they are
the ones with the potential to have an impact on FDI flows.’’ However, the
underlying reasoning that developing countries are unlikely to undertake much FDI
in other developing countries has become less compelling in the recent past, and
BITs may play a more important role in future FDI relations among developing
countries.
Eighth, we run separate regressions for the United States as a source country to
compare our results with those obtained by previous studies. Like Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman (2005), we cannot establish any clear link between US BITs and US FDI
to developing countries. We never obtain a statistically significant coefficient for
BIT. This outcome can partly be explained by the fact that the United States has not
concluded a large number of BITs. As of 1 June 2008, the United States had ratified
a total of 40 BITs (and 29 BITs with the 83 developing countries included in our
sample), whereas Germany had concluded 114 (70) and the United Kingdom 91
(57) (UNCTAD 2008b). This is even though US multinationals accounted for 19.2%
of total outward FDI stocks in 2005, much more than the corresponding figures for
German (9.1%) and British (11.6%) multinationals (UNCTAD 2008a). Moreover,
the United States concluded BITs with some countries mainly for political reasons.
For instance, US commercial interest did not play a major role in Morocco and
Jordan. The peculiar findings for the United States clearly reveal that it is important
to include as many source countries as possible, as we do in this paper, to avoid any
bias due to country-specific effects and to provide a comprehensive assessment of
the impact of BITs on FDI.
Finally, we test for possible dilution effects due to the proliferation of BITs. We
include the total number of BITs ratified with all host countries (in our sample) by
the source country belonging to a specific pair of a BIT as an additional explanatory
variable. While the sign of this control variable is often negative, we do not get any
significant results (not shown in the table). Importantly, the sign and significance
level of the pair-wise BIT dummy are not affected by the inclusion of this additional
control variable.
In another set of robustness checks, we use two alternative FDI measures, that is,
bilateral FDI flows in million US$ (FDI3) and in percent of the host country’s GDP
(FDI4).44 As can be seen in Table 5, the BIT variable is always significant in all
four model specifications and for all three econometric methods. The significance
levels are often somewhat lower if we use FDI flows as a share of the host country’s
GDP as the dependent variable. This outcome might be due to the fact that GDP
stands on both sides of the equation, which could lead to less reliable estimates for
the explanatory variables.
In summary, our robustness checks strongly support our basic message that BITs
help attract FDI to developing host countries, even though the size and significance
level of coefficients differ somewhat across different specifications.
44 To save space, we continue to only report the results with zero observations for FDI flows included.
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7 Conclusions
Policy makers in almost all developing countries are engaged in fierce competition
for FDI. However, it has remained disputed how effective the means are that
national policy makers have at their disposal when attempting to attract FDI inflows.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of BITs that have increasingly been concluded
in order to reduce uncertainty of foreign investors in a credible way and, thus, to
promote FDI flows to developing countries.
Few earlier studies have addressed the effectiveness of BITs, and the available
empirical evidence is inconclusive. Depending on the particular study, we argue
that previous evaluations of the effectiveness of BITs are distorted due to sample
selection and omitted variable biases as well as the potential endogeneity of BITs
in the regressions. We attempt to overcome these econometric concerns by
covering a much larger sample of host and source countries, by accounting for
unilateral FDI liberalization, and by including an appropriate instrumental variable
approach.
Our main finding is that BITs do promote FDI flows to developing countries. This
result is fairly robust across various models. Moreover, the significantly positive
effect of BITs on bilateral FDI flows holds for FDI flows from developed source
countries to various sub-samples of developing host countries. BITs may even
substitute for weak local institutions, though probably not for unilateral FDI-related
liberalization measures.
All this suggests that policy makers in developing countries have resorted to an
effective means to promote FDI by concluding BITs. Nevertheless, our analysis
leaves several questions for future research. It depends not only on the benefits in
terms of higher FDI inflows but also on the costs involved whether ratifying still
more BITs would be rational. Costs may arise by reducing the policy options host
countries might want to consider in selecting FDI projects at the entry stage and in
regulating approved FDI projects after entry. In particular, it remains open to debate
Table 5 Robustness checks and extensions, alternative FDI measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model I II III IV
Dependent variable and
estimation technique
FDI3, OLS fixed effects 0.324*** (4.03) 0.239*** (2.84) 0.276** (2.05) 0.237*** (2.74)
FDI3, PPML fixed effects 0.200*** (4.08) 0.117** (2.35) 0.282*** (3.37) 0.122** (2.44)
FDI3, System GMM 0.168** (2.23) 0.155** (2.00) 0.164** (2.04) 0.385** (2.24)
FDI4, OLS fixed effects 0.425*** (2.77) 0.344** (2.15) 0.331* (1.72) 0.352** (2.15)
FDI4, PPML fixed effects 0.254** (1.94) 0.183* (1.67) 0.464* (1.69) 0.179* (1.65)
FDI4, System GMM 0.487*** (3.13) 0.433*** (2.70) 0.449*** (2.76) 0.691** (1.93)
To save space, we only report the results for the BIT variable; z-values are reported in parentheses; ***,
** and * denote significance at the level of 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. See Tables 1 and 3 for further
notes
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whether host countries have reason to feel unduly constrained given that recent BITs
have become more binding and broader in coverage. Concerns are that recent BITs
have shifted the balance towards the interests of profit maximizing foreign investors
and away from the developmental interests of host countries. This calls for a
detailed evaluation of the contents of BITs, rather than only focusing on the number
of BITs.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of more BITs to come will be affected by
several factors. On the one hand, as argued by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2006),
the proliferation of BITs is likely to result in diminishing returns. With an ever
increasing share of bilateral FDI covered by contractual arrangements, BITs would
no longer be a distinctive factor signaling the host country’s readiness to protect
foreign investors. The future effectiveness of BITs may be eroded further if
plurilateral and multilateral agreements increasingly include FDI-related prescrip-
tions. At the same time, the binding character of BITs may become less relevant:
if the trend of unilateral FDI liberalization continues and reversals are rare, more
and more developing countries will improve their reputation of treating FDI
favorably.
On the other hand, BITs going beyond the ‘‘traditional admission model’’
(UNCTAD 2007, p. 155) may have a stronger impact on FDI. To capture this effect,
future research should explore possibilities to relax the assumption of homogenous
BITs. It would be an important step towards a more realistic treatment of BITs if, as
suggested by UNCTAD, two main models could be distinguished, with the ‘‘new’’
model involving a higher degree of discipline than the traditional model. To arrive
at a nuanced categorization, three aspects of heterogeneity seem to be of particular
importance: (i) BITs with explicit provisions relating to the pre-establishment phase
should be treated differently from those granting protection only after establish-
ment; (ii) BITs with pervasive provisions related to performance requirements may
be separated from those without such provisions; and (iii) BITs including investor-
state arbitration should be distinguished from those being limited to state-to-state
arbitration.
But it is not only with regard to BITs that heterogeneity should be taken into
account. The same may be required with respect to the dependent FDI variable. For
instance, Gallagher and Birch (2006) suspect that BITs have been a more effective
means of FDI promotion in South America than in Mesoamerica because of the
different types of FDI attracted by the two sub-regions. Arguably, the protection of
FDI through BITs is more relevant for horizontal, market-seeking FDI which stands
in direct competition with local companies than for vertical, efficiency-seeking FDI.
Future research may also explore in more detail the links between sector-specific
BIT provisions, e.g., with regard to services, and sector-specific FDI flows. Data
constraints may render it impossible to address such questions in panel studies; but
country-specific studies may offer detailed insights to this effect.
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Appendix 1
See Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6 Definition of variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source
FDI1 Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in
percent of total FDI to all developing countries
included in our sample, including zeros
UNCTAD (2008a)
FDI2 Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in
percent of total FDI to all developing countries
included in our sample, excluding zeros
UNCTAD (2008a)
FDI3 Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in
mill. US$, including zeros
UNCTAD (2008a)
FDI4 Bilateral FDI flows from source to host country in
percent of GDP of host country, including zeros
UNCTAD (2008a)
GDP Real GDP, constant 2000 US$ World Bank (2006)
DiffGDPpc Difference between source and host countries’ GDP
per capita, constant 2000 US$
World Bank (2006)
Growth Real GDP growth rate of host country in percent World Bank (2006)
Inflation Inflation rate of host country in percent (GDP
deflator)
World Bank (2006)
Openness Sum of imports and exports in percent of GDP (host
country)
World Bank (2006)
BIT Bilateral investment treaty, ratified between source
and host country
UNCTAD (2008b)
DTT Double taxation treaty, ratified between source and
host country
IBFD (2008)
CommonCurrency Common currency between source and host country Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
RTA Dummy regional trade agreement WTO (2008)
PolCon Political constraints III, Henisz database, range from
0 to 1
Henisz (2000)
CapOpen Indicator for capital account openness; Chinn–Ito
index on financial openness
Chinn and Ito (2005); data
kindly provided by Hiro Ito
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Appendix 2
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey , United Kingdom, United States,
Venezuela
Source country sample
Developing source countries in italics
Appendix 3
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal,
Seychelles, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Host country sample
Table 7 Descriptive statistics for the main variables
Variable Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
ln (FDI1) 14,077 0.30 0.83 0 5.30
ln (FDI2) 3,726 1.13 1.28 0 5.30
GDP 14,077 23.26 1.70 19.14 28.07
ln (DiffGDPpc) 14,077 8.76 4.54 -10.15 11.21
Growth 14,077 3.46 5.58 -18.20 77.70
ln (Inflation) 14,077 3.02 1.66 -3.25 9.43
Openness 14,077 73.10 39.86 9.31 245.80
BIT 14,077 0.18 0.37 0 1
DTT 14,077 0.21 0.40 0 1
CommonCurrency 14,077 0.01 0.10 0 1
RTA 14,077 0.05 0.21 0 1
PolCon 14,077 0.25 0.20 0 0.68
CapOpen 13,747 -0.22 1.33 -1.75 2.62
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